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·, \ l .,, \'J '_j[> 
and other American Indians similarly _____________ ----- . . 
situated, ---Cl~;. -.:Supreme (..ourt, l·r: ,. 
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vs. Case No. 
8589 
PORTER L. MERRE.LL, individually 
and as County Clerk, Duchesne 
County, Utah, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
K. ROGER BEAN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PRESTON ALLEN, suing for himself 
and other American Indians similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PORTER L. MERRELL, individually 
and as County Clerk, Duchesne 
County, Utah, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
8589 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant acknowledges the statement of facts con-
tained in the brief of plaintiff as substantially true and 
adopts it for purposes of his argument herein. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
IT IS THE PROVINCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
STATES TO GRANT OR WITHHOLD THE 
ELECTIVE FRANCHISE AND TO FIX THE 
QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS. 
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POINT II 
PARAGRAPH (11), SECTION 20-2-14, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS A REASONABLE 
EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER 
TO ESTABLISH VOTING RESIDENCE RE~ 
QUIREMENTS AND CONTRAVENES NO PRO-
VISION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION. 
A. Applicable and Inapplicable Provisions of Federal 
Law. 
B. The Basis of the Exclusion is Federal Control and 
not Race or Color. 
C. Federal Control of Indians and Their Property. 
POINT III 
AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE IS PRE-
SUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL 
SHOWN CLEARLY TO BE OTHERWISE, AND 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE PARTY 
CHALLENGING ITS VALIDITY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS THE PROVINCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
STATES TO GRANT OR WITHHOLD THE 
ELECTIVE FRANCHISE AND TO FIX THE 
QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS. 
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It has long been a settled point in our law that it is 
the individual states, and not the United States, which grant 
the right of suffrage to their citizens. In Minor v. Happer-
sett, 88 U. S. 162 (1875), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the State of Missouri had the right to specify 
which of its citizens should constitute its electorate, and 
that case has since been widely cited and consistently fol-
lowed. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), 
for example, the Supreme Court stated succinctly that "The 
right to vote in the states comes from the states; * * *" 
and cited the H appersett case by way of authority. To the 
same effect is the language of Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 
621 (1904), at page 632: 
"The privilege to vote in any State is not given 
by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amend-
ments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship 
of the United States. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 
162. It may not be refused on account of race, color 
or previous condition of servitude, but it does not 
follow from mere citizenship of the United States. 
In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is 
within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exer-
cised as the State may direct, and upon such terms 
as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no 
discrimination is made between individuals in vio-
lation of the Federal Constitution." 
Reference to further authority on this point seems unneces-
sary. 
Since the state's constitutional or statutory law is the 
source of the elective franchise, the state may impose rea-
sonable conditions upon its exercise. State v. Holzmueller, 
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5 Atl. 2d 251, 254; People v. Lipsky, 63 N. E. 2d 642, 645. 
The state may require as a prerequisite to registration the 
payment of a poll tax, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U. S. 277 
(1937), Pirtle v. Brown, 118 Fed. 2d 218, or proof that the 
applicant for registration can read and write, Allen v. 
Sharp, 184 S. E. 27 (N. C. 1936), Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 
Fed. 2d 563 (CA La. 1933), and it may, as expressed by 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Clark v. Quick, 36 N. E. 2d 
563 ( 1941), impose necessary procedural requirements. At 
page 565, the court stated: 
"Another preliminary observation will dispose 
of considerable argument in the briefs. A great deal 
is said on both sides concerning the right of every 
voter to express his will at the polls and it is clearly 
inferable from the arguments that this is considered 
to be an absolute right. It is enough to point out 
that it is not an absolute, but a conditional right. 
It is conditional, in some cities, upon previous regis-
tration; it is conditional upon not moving from one 
precinct to another within thirty days; it is condi-
tional upon reaching the polling place while the polls 
are open, even though failure to do so might be 
entirely without fault on the part of the voter, and 
it is conditional in the case of absent voters, on the 
proper application being made within the proper 
time and in accordance with the statute. The right 
to vote is conditional upon many other things which 
might be mentioned and upon circumstances which 
may or may not appear to be within the control of 
the voter. No good purpose can be served by dis-
cussing any of the bad results which might follow 
from a failure to meet the conditions. No one doubts 
the legislative power to prescribe reasonable condi-
tions and any fault which may be found with them 
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must be taken up with the legislative rather than 
the judicial branch of government." 
In Utah, the right to vote is granted by Article IV, 
Section 2 of our Constitution. It reads: 
"Every citizen of the United States, of the age 
of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have 
been a citizen for ninety days, and shall have resided 
in the State or Territory one year, in the county 
four months, and in the precinct sixty days next 
preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote at 
such election except as herein otherwise provided." 
But this court has made it clear that the right is not abso-
lute, and that the legislature may enact reasonable qualify-
ing provisions which must be complied with before the 
right may be exercised. In Evans v. Reiser, 78 U. 253, 2 
P. 2d 615 (1931), at 2 P. 2d 624, this court said: 
"* * * Thus while a person possessing the 
necessary qualifications has a right to vote, such 
right is not absolute. The Legislature may prescribe 
reasonable rules and regulations which must be com-
plied with before the right becomes absolute. The 
right is to be exercised by means of a secret ballot, 
or other secret means. In order to carry into effect 
the constitutional provision requiring that secrecy in 
voting be observed, it is not only competent but it is 
the clear duty of the lawmaking power to enact such 
laws as will, in its opinion, effect that purpose. So 
long as the provisions enacted into law by the Legis-
lature may be said to be reasonable, the plain duty 
of the courts is to give such provisions full force 
and effect, regardless of what views they may en-
tertain about the wisdom of the law. * * *" 
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It remains, then, to examine the effect of paragraph (11), 
Section 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to see whether 
it is either unreasonable or in violation of some provision 
of federal law. 
POINT II 
PARAGRAPH (11), SECTION 20-2-14, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS A REASONABLE 
EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER 
TO ESTABLISH VOTING RESIDENCE RE-
QUIREMENTS AND CONTRAVENES NO PRO-
VISION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION. 
A. Applicable and Inapplicable Provisions of Federal 
Law. 
Plaintiff claims that the statute in question, Section 
20-2-14, violates four provisions of the United States Con-
stitution and two provisions of federal law: (1) The Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, (2) 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amend-
ment, (3) Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, 
(4) The 15th Amendment, and (5) 42 USC 1983 and 42 
usc 1971. 
Our attention is directed under Point I of the plain-
tiff's brief to a number of rights that are protected under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 
2 of the federal constitution, but the right to vote is not one 
of them. The reason was explained by the United States 
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Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) 
supra, thusly: 
"* * * By article 4, sec. 2, it is provided 
that 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several States.' If suffrage is necessarily a part of 
citizenship, then the citizens of each State must be 
entitled to vote in the several States precisely as 
their citizens are. This is more than asserting that 
they may change their residence and become citizens 
of the State and thus be voters. It goes to the extent 
of insisting that while retaining their original citi-
zenship they may vote in any State. This, we think, 
has never been claimed. * * * " 
To the same effect is State v. Kirby, 163 S. W. 2d 990 
(Mo. 1942). See also 12 Am. Jur., Con. Law, Section 466. 
Nor has the right to vote been considered one of the 
privileges and immunities protected by the 14th Amend-
ment. See Minor v. Happersett, supra, Pope v. Williams, 
193 U. S. 621, supra, and 12 Am. Jur. Con. Law, Section 
466, supra. 
In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927), the U. S. 
Supreme Court made the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment the basis for a holding that a negro was en-
titled to vote in a primary election, but Indians patently 
are neither equally protected by state laws, nor equally 
responsible under them. They are protected instead by a 
host of federal laws, as will be pointed out in more detail, 
and it is therefore doubtful that the equal protection clause 
has any bearing on the problem before us. 25 USC 349 
provides that after the fee patent in allotted lands passes 
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to an Indian, he is entitled to equal protection under state 
laws, and this seems to suggest that the equal protection 
clause is not presently applicable. 
It is unnecessary to consider the statutory provisions 
plaintiff relies on since they are enacted pursuant to the 
constitutional provisions above referred to, and any efficacy 
they have is by virtue of said provisions. Further, the con-
stitutional provisions cited are self-executing, as the plain-
tiff has pointed out in his brief, and therefore reliance upon 
such statutory measures seems unnecessary. 
We come then to the 15th Amendment, and if there 
exists any conflict, it must be with this provision of the 
United States Constitution. Unless it abridges the right to 
vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude, state action does not offend this amendment. 
B. The Basis of the Exclusion is Federal Control and 
not Race or Color. 
Plaintiff contends that the defendant has denied him 
the right to vote on the basis of race or color, and cites 
numerous cases holding this kind of conduct unconstitu-
tional. We agree with the holdings of most of the cited 
cases, but they have no application here. There is not the 
least foundation for the claim that the plaintiff's action 
complained of herein was motivated by considerations of 
race or color. On the contrary, the defendant's written 
statement, quoted at page 4 of the complaint and page 5 
of plaintiff's brief, shows that the basis of the defendant's 
action was that the plaintiff "lives on an Indian reservation 
and did not establish a residence in any other precinct in 
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the State of Utah prior to * * *" his application for 
an absentee ballot. This action is in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (11), Section 20-2-14, U. C. A. 
1953, which reads : 
"(11) Any person living upon any Indian or 
military reservation shall not be deemed a resident 
of Utah within the meaning of this chapter, unless 
such person had acquired a residence in some county 
in Utah prior to taking up his residence upon such 
Indian or military reservation." 
It is conceded that persons disqualified on the basis of 
residence might all happen to belong to a particular race 
or be of a particular color, but that argument cannot be 
seriously advanced here. It is common knowledge in Utah 
that much of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation has been open 
to non-Indians for settlement (see brief of plaintiff, pp. 
3-4) and that there are today more white persons residing 
on the reservation than there are Indians. And there can 
be no question that the statute under attack applies by its 
terms to white persons equally with Indians. 
Additional evidence that the exclusion of the statute is 
not one of race or color but of residence, is the context in 
which it is found. It is grouped with the rest of the resi-
dence provisions, and logically follows that which precedes 
it. Further, the reference to "any person living upon any 
Indian * * * reservation" is side by side with a simi-
lar provision with respect to "any * * * military res-
ervation". When this fact is noted, the question then occurs 
whether the plaintiff would not be more consistent to allege 
also that the statute discriminates against unmarried en-
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listed men, since they are ordinarily required to live within 
the confines of the military post, while officers and enlisted 
men with families are usually permitted to take up residence 
off the post and thus establish a voting residence. On the 
contrary, the plaintiff has found in his brief a basis of 
distinction between cases upholding the disfranchisement of 
residents of military reservations, but in fact there is no 
distinction. The crux of the question in both instances is 
federal control, and as will be later shown, the control ap-
plies with respect to the territory within the Indian reser-
vation as well as within the military. There are appended 
hereto, as Exhibits A and B, copies of two Attorney Gener-
al's opinions on the voting residence of persons residing 
on military reservations in Utah which we believe demon-
strate the consistency of the state's application of the stat-
ute in question. 
The plaintiff, however, finds fault with the opinion of 
the Attorney General attached to his brief as Appendix B. 
He points out at page 26 of his brief that the opinion men-
tions no other group or class except Indians and is applied 
to Indians alone, thereby discriminating against them. But 
he overlooks mentioning that the question was asked with 
respect to Indians only, and not to persons in general. The 
opinion seems somewhat less discriminatory when this 
point is considered. 
This raises the question whether the plaintiff has not 
become confused in the object of his attack. It is not sur-
prising that he prefers the opinions of Attorneys General 
Chez and Giles since they reach a conclusion which permits 
the plaintiff and those he represents to vote. But we are 
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unable to understand his approval of the method by which 
that conclusion was reached. At page 27 of his brief he 
sets forth some of the reasoning underlying that opinion 
and we agree that it has merit. We would acknowledge 
that the statute in question is over half a century in age, 
and that great strides have been made in that time toward 
lifting the Indians from the benighted state into which 
short-sighted federal policy has plunged them. But we 
think that legislation on the part of the Attorney General 
to accomplish the "modernization" of the statute is inde-
fensible. If the English language is capable of conveying 
an idea clearly, it does so in this statute. The words are 
"any Indian or military reservation" (emphasis added). 
There is nothing in it about "open" or "closed" reservations. 
Had the legislature intended such a distinction to exist, 
there is every reason to believe it would have said so. No 
one will dispute that strong reasons impel us toward grant-
ing the vote to those who reside on Indian reservations, but 
amendment of statutes is a legislative function. 
In truth, when the statute is applied as enacted, there 
is no discrimination against the Indians. If the defendant 
is permitting some white persons, who are not more quali-
fied than the plaintiff and those in whose behalf he is suing, 
to vote since the issuance of the Attorney General's opinion 
(plaintiff's brief Appendix B), he might properly be re-
strained; however, nothing appears from the complaint 
herein to show that any white persons permitted by the 
defendant to vote had not established voting residences else-
where in Utah before taking up residence on the reservation. 
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C. Federal Control of Indians and Their Property. 
We have pointed out that the reasonableness of the 
distinction made in paragraph ( 11) , Section 20-2-14, turns 
on the question of federal control. In Herken v. Glynn, 101 
P. 2d 946 (Kan. 1940) the court dealt with the question 
whether those persons residing on a tract of federal gov-
ernment land set aside for a soldiers' home, were entitled 
to vote in Kansas. It concluded they were not so entitled, 
and in the course of the opinion stated: • 
"* * * In authorities treating the matter 
generally, it is said that where a cession of a tract 
is made by a state to the United States for the pur-
poses mentioned in the above constitutional provi-
sion, and there is no reservation of jurisdiction by 
the state other than the right to serve civil and crim-
inal process on the ceded lands, persons who reside 
on such lands do not acquire any electiYe franchise 
as inhabitants of the ceding state. See McCrary on 
Elections, 4th Ed. § 89, p. 68 ; Paine on Elections, § 
63, p. 44 ; Kennan on Residence and Domicile § 493, 
p. 844; 20 C. J., Elections, § 33, p. 7 4; 18 Am. Jur., 
Elections, § 66, p. 224." 
Similar holdings on this point are found in State v. 
Smith, 103 N. E. 2d 822 (Ohio 1951) and Arledge v. Mabry, 
197 P. 2d 884 (N. Mex. 1948). In the latter case the court 
found that the involved land was not in New Mexico for 
voting residence purposes. 
The enabling act admitting Utah to the union is of 
some interest at this point. Part of Section 3 reads as fol-
lows: 
"Second. That the people inhabiting said pro-
posed State do agree that they forever disclaim all 
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right and title to the unappropriated public lands 
lying within the boundaries thereof; and to all lands 
lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian 
or Indian tribes ; and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the 
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition 
of the United States, and said Indian lands shall 
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control 
of the Congress of the United States; that the lands 
belonging to citizens of the United States residing 
without the said State shall never be taxed at a 
higher rate than the lands belonging to residents 
thereof; that no taxes shall be imposed by the State 
on lands or property therein belonging to or which 
may hereafter be purchased by the United States or 
reserved for its use; but nothing herein, or in the 
ordinance herein provided for, shall preclude the 
said State from taxing, as other lands are taxed, any 
lands owned or held by any Indian who has severed 
his tribal relations and has obtained from the United 
States or from any person a title thereto by patent 
or other grant, save and except such lands as have 
been or may be granted to any Indian or Indians 
under any Act of Congress containing a provision 
exempting the lands thus granted from taxation; but 
said ordinance shall provide that all such lands shall 
be exempt from taxation by said State so long and 
to such extent as such Act of Congress may pre-
scribe." 
en~: No clearer relinquishment of state control over territory 
can be imagined, and except for those portions actually 
~n u ceded back to the state or granted in fee to Indians or other 
,ast persons the territory within the reservation remains subject 
to federal control. Any land granted in fee or returned to 
private or state ownership by any means is granted or 
returned in accordance with terms fixed by Congress and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
administered by the Secretary of the Interior at their plea-
sure. It is a fact that title to the land upon which the plain-
tiff resides is in the United States. 
It is suggested in the plaintiff's brief that because of 
recent federal legislation granting new privileges to and 
removing certain restrictions from many tribes of Indians, 
they are pretty much like any other citizens of the State 
of Utah. We wish it were so, but a quick reading of Title 
25, USCA creates a different impression. Apparently 
the U. S. government does not believe the Indians are as 
close to the complete independence they so long have de-
served as this court is asked to believe. Tribal Indians 
plainly are not on the same basis with other residents of the 
State in the matters of taxation by the state, subjection 
to state criminal laws, control over contractural matters 
and control and disposition of real and personal property. 
See, for example, 25 USC 465 on the tax status of lands 
acquired by the Secretary of Interior for the use of Indians; 
Section 412a of the same title on the tax status of Indian 
homesteads; Section 349 on the availability of patented 
land for the satisfaction of debts incurred prior to the issue 
of the patent; Section 371 on the descent of Indian prop-
erty to children of a marriage "according to the custom 
and manner of Indian life" ; Sections 671 and 677 et seq. 
(USC Supp. III) on control of contractural relations; 18 
USC 1151 and 1154, and Section 3242 on criminal jurisdic-
tion; and 18 USC Sections 1162 and 1360 (Supplement Ill) 
on the granting of criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
Indians to certain states, but not to Utah. 
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It cannot be denied that although progress is being 
made toward independence, tribal Indians are still wards 
of the government. Congress has established an Indian 
claims commission. There is a separate bureau-the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs-within the Department of Interior, and 
a separate title in the U. S. code for legislation pertaining 
especially to Indians. 
In plaintiff's brief, considerable reliance is placed on 
the decision in Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P. 2d 456 (Ariz. 
1948). There was involved in this case a provision of the 
Arizona constitution which denied persons under guardian-
ship the right to vote. We are not dealing with such a pro-
vision here, and that decision consequently is not disposi-
tive of this case. It is, however, informative with respect to 
the status of Indians generally. We quote from page 459: 
"It would be idle to contend that tribal Indians 
do not still occupy a peculiar and unique relationship 
to the federal government. They are, except for a 
few civilized tribes, still regarded and treated by the 
United States as requiring special consideration and 
protection. For nearly a century they were treated 
as separate 'nations' and the legal rights of the mem-
bers were fixed by treaty. Many of these treaties 
are still in force and of recognized validity. How-
ever, Congress stopped making such treaties in the 
year 1871, but since then more than four thousand 
distinct statutory enactments have been passed by 
the Congress comprising what is commonly referred 
to as 'Indian Law'. Many of the Federal enactments 
arise from the express grant to Congress found in 
article 1, section 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution of the 
United States; 'to regulate Commerce * * * with 
the Indian Tribes;'. Generally speaking tribal In-
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dians are not subject to State law. The exemption 
is particularly true in the fields of criminal law and 
taxation." 
See also Porter v. Hall, 271 Pac. 411 (Ariz. 1928). 
The exclusion resulting from Paragraph (11), Section 
20-2-14 is a reasonable one based on federal control over 
the persons and property involved, and has no relation to 
race or color. 
POINT III 
AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE IS PRE-
SUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL 
SHOWN CLEARLY TO BE OTHERWISE, AND 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE PARTY 
CHALLENGING ITS VALIDITY. 
There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor 
of every statute duly enacted by the legislature. Norville 
v. State Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P. 2d 937 (1940), 
Gubler v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board, 192 P. 
2d 580 (Ut. 1948). In the latter case, the principle was 
expressed thus: 
"There are certain fundamental principles 
which must be taken into consideration by this court 
before we strike down an act of the Legislature. 
Quoting from Section 39, Black's Handbook of Con-
stitutional Law: 'Every p1~esumption is in favor of 
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. 
* * * Every reasonable doubt must be resolved 
in favor of the statute, not against it; and the courts 
will not adjudge it invalid unless the violation of 
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the constitution is, in their judgment, clear, com-
plete, and unmistakable.'" 
In view of the presumption, the party asserting invalidity 
must clearly show the alleged conflict between the statute 
and the constitution, and prove its existence beyond all 
doubt. 11 Am. Jur. Con. Law, Section 132. The plaintiff 
has failed to sustain that burden in this case. He has argued 
that the legislation is out-dated, and we agree that there is 
some basis for this view. He has also demonstrated the 
need for legislative reform through the policy arguments 
he has advanced. But he has failed to show any discrimina-
tion against the plaintiff or those similarly situated on the 
basis of race or color in violation of the 15th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution or any other provision 
thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
The alternative writ should be quashed and the com-
plaint dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
K. ROGER BEAN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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APPENDIX A 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY 14, UTAH 
56 058 
June 1, 1956 
Tooele County Commission 
REQUESTED BY: Willard H. Sagers, Clerk, Too-
ele County Commission 
OPINION BY: 
QUESTIONS: 
CONCLUSIONS: 
E. R. Callister, Attorney Gen-
eral 
Walter L. Budge, Assistant 
Attorney General 
1. Is it legal for the Tooele 
County Commission to estab-
lish a voting district at Dug-
way Proving Grounds? 
2. Is it legal for a person liv-
ing at Dugway Proving 
Grounds to vote at a near-by 
voting precinct if a voting dis-
trict is not established on the 
post? 
3. A gentleman has lived at 
Dugway since coming to Amer-
ica several years ago and is 
now a naturalized American 
citizen. Where will he be eli-
gible to register and vote? 
1. No. 
2. No, but see opinion. 
3. See opinion. 
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II 
Title 20, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
pertains to registration for elections. Section 14 
thereof provides in part as follows: 
"For the purpose of registration or voting, 
the place of residence of any person must be 
governed by the following rules as far as they 
are applicable: 
1. That place must be considered and held 
to be the residence of a person in which his hab-
itation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is 
absent, he has the intention of returning. 
2. A person must not be held to have 
gained or lost a residence by reason of his pres-
ence or absence while employed in the service 
of the United States or of this state * * * 
or while residing upon any * * * military 
reservation. 
* * * * 
5. A person must not be considered to 
have gained a residence in any county to which 
he comes merely for temporary purposes, with-
out the intention of making such county his 
home. 
* * * * 
9. A change of residence can only be made 
by the act of removal, joined with the intent to 
remain in another place. A residence cannot be 
lost until another is gained. 
* * * * 
11. Any person living upon any * * * 
military reservation shall not be deemed a resi-
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III 
dent of Utah within the meaning of this chap-
ter unless such person had acquired a residence 
in some county in Utah prior to taking up his 
residence upon such * * * military reser-
vation. 
The Dugway Proving Grounds is a United 
States Military Reservation. The situation here is 
not analagous to one arising under the Lanham Act, 
Public Law No. 849, 76th Congress, 54 Stats. 1125, 
for under that act the Congress of the United States 
expressly preserved the "civil rights of inhabitants 
of such public housing projects", and it has been 
held that the "civil rights therein, expressly pre-
served, included the political right of suffrage". 
Johnson vs. Morrill, 126 P. 2d 673, State vs. Cor-
coran, 128 P. 2d 999. The Lanham Act and the cases 
first above cited, had to do with federal lands which 
were not upon a military reservation. That fact is 
material. 
Where the State cedes the realty to the United 
States, as is the case at Dugway, and it becomes a 
"military reservation", there remains no right to 
vote at election precincts established on the realty 
prior to the cession. In so holding, we follow the 
authority laid down in the case of H erken vs. Glynn, 
101 P. 2d 946, 151 Kan. 855, wherein that court said: 
"Residence on the realty in Leavenworth 
County, Kansas, whereon the National Home for 
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers was established by 
the United States after the state ceded the 
realty to the United States, had no right to vote 
at election precincts established on the realty 
prior to the cession ; the right to vote not being 
a 'municipal right' so as to persist after ces-
sion." 
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Jurisdiction over the Dugway Proving Grounds 
rests in the United States, and the State of Utah has 
retained only its right of process, civil and criminal. 
"Where a state cedes to the United States 
lands for forts, etc. reserving concurrent juris-
diction to serve state process, civil and criminal, 
in the ceded place, such reservation merely op-
erates as a condition of the grant and does not 
defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States over such place * * * " 
14 Am. Jur., page 924 35 et seq. 
Following the above authorities, we are con-
strained to here declare that the Tooele County Com-
missioners cannot legally establish a voting district 
at Dugway Proving Grounds on realty ceded to the 
United States and under the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral government. 
Question No. 2 : A person living at Dugway 
Proving Grounds would not be eligible to vote at a 
near-by voting precinct off the reservation unless 
and until he could qualify and be eligible to prescribe 
to the oath required by Section 20-2-11, U. C. A. 
1953. It would be mandatory that he swear that he 
resided in such election district at the time he took 
the registration oath. If a person had a right to 
vote in the State of Utah and had acquired a resi-
dence in some county prior to taking up his residence 
on the military reservation, he would not have lost 
that residence by reason of his presence on the reser-
vation. See 20-2-14 {2) supra. Such a person would 
retain his right to vote at his established residence 
in Utah. This resolves your question No. 2. 
Question No. 3 : If the gentleman you refer to 
lived at Dugway and was naturalized prior to the 
cession of those lands to the United States, he would 
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be eligible to vote in Tooele County, providing he 
met the requirements of Section 20-2-20, supra, and 
could under such section transfer to a lawful voting 
precinct but he would, of course, have to reside in 
the election district in which he desired to vote so 
that he could subscribe to the registration oath. If 
the gentleman became a naturalized American citi-
zen after the realty at Dugway Proving Grounds 
had been ceded to the federal government, he would 
not be able to gain a residence for the purpose of 
registration or voting while continuing to reside 
upon the military reservation, Section 20-2-14 (2), 
(9) and (11) supra. 
We are not unmindful of the pronouncement of 
the Utah Supreme Court which declares that our 
election laws seek liberality of interpretation against 
disenfranchisement, Clegg vs. Bennion, 247 P. 2d 
614, 615, ... Ut. . . . . However, there is absolutely 
no ambiguity in the wording of the statutes here-
inabove set forth, and it has been, and remains, the 
opinion of this office that a person living upon and 
within the confines of a military reservation may 
not establish a residence for voting purposes unless 
such person had previously acquired a voting resi-
dence in some county in Utah prior to taking up his 
residence thereat. 
Enlarging upon our letter addressed to you 
under date of August 29, 1954, we do here state that 
a person having previously acquired a voting resi-
dence in Utah or elsewhere would not, by residing 
upon a military reservation, have lost such residence, 
and that such a person would and should be able to 
vote at his former residence according to the laws of 
Utah or of his place of former residence wherever 
that might be by absentee ballot or as otherwise by 
law provided. 
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To be a qualified elector in this state, or as far 
as the writer knows, in any other state, a voter must 
comply with the election laws and fully meet require-
ments thereof. It has long been in this nation the 
fact that some of the citizens have been disenfran-
chised by reasa-n of their residence at particular 
places, so we are not here dealing with a new or 
unique situation. We have reference to the District 
of Columbia, (where this was until very recently 
the fact), to the Military Reservation at Fort Doug-
las, and to many other federally controlled lands 
and installations throughout the country. 
WLB;jt 
Very truly yours, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
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APPENDIX B 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY 14, UTAH 
August 31, 1956 
Mrs. G. F. Burnett 
487 East 200 South 
Clearfield, Utah 
Dear Mrs. Burnett: 
In reply to your letter of August 29, 1956, be ad-
vised that Section 20-2-14, U. C. A. 1953, paragraph 
11, reads as follows: · 
"Any person living upon any Indian or military 
reservation shall not be deemed a resident of 
Utah within the meaning of this chapter, unless 
such person had acquired a residence in some 
county in Utah prior to taking up his residence 
upon such Indian or military reservation." 
Under the foregoing section a person living on a 
military reservation cannot vote in the state of Utah 
unless they have qualified to vote before moving to 
the reservation. 
The statutes of our state further require that a per-
son must be a resident of the state for at least one 
year before he can register and vote and must have 
resided in one certain county for three months prior 
to registration. 
The only way either one of these matters can be 
changed is by having the Legislature change the law. 
PMLjjlt 
Very truly yours, 
PETER M. LOWE 
Deputy Attorney General 
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